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People commonly overestimate the intensity of their emotions toward future events. In
other words, they display an impact bias. This research addresses the question whether
people learn from their experiences and correct for the impact bias. We hypothesize that
athletes display an impact bias and, counterintuitively, that increased experience with an
event increases this impact bias. A field study in the context of competitive track
athletics supported our hypotheses by showing that athletes clearly overestimated their
emotions toward the outcome of a track event and that this impact bias was more
pronounced for negative events than for positive events. Moreover, with increased
athletic experience this impact bias became larger. This effect could not be explained
by athletes’ forecasted emotions, but it could be explained by the emotions they actually
felt following the race. The more experience athletes had with athletics, the less they felt
negative emotions after unsuccessful goal attainment. These findings are discussed in
relation to possible underlying emotion regulation processes.
Every day people make affective forecasts. They
anticipate how certain decisions or events will make
them feel. These decisions and events vary considerably
in importance, ranging from mundane issues such as
picking a TV dinner in the supermarket to important
issues such as whether to take a job offer. What they
all have in common, however, is that people try to
anticipate how these decisions and events will make
them feel. Given their prominence and potential
importance in determining future behavior and well-
being, one would expect affective forecasts to be
accurate. Abundant research suggests, however, that
people are quite inaccurate in forecasting their emotions
to future decisions or events. They commonly overesti-
mate the intensity and duration of their emotions to a
large variety of focal events, that is, they display an
impact bias (for an overview, see Wilson & Gilbert,
2003). Although the literature leaves little doubt about
the robustness of the impact bias, the role of experience
with the focal event has received little attention. Do
people learn from their mistakes? Our research aims to
illuminate the role of experience in the impact bias.
Counter to intuition, we argue that experience will
increase rather than decrease the impact bias. Thus,
we propose that people learn from their mistakes.
However, rather than learning to make more accurate
affective forecasts, we hypothesize that they learn to
more efficiently cope with their emotions.
AFFECTIVE FORECASTING AND
THE IMPACT BIAS
Research on affective forecasting typically compares
people’s predictions about how they will feel in response
to a future event with their actual felt emotions
following the event. This research converges to suggest
that people are often inaccurate in forecasting the
intensity and duration of their future emotions,
especially their negative emotions (Wilson & Gilbert,
2003). This impact bias—the tendency of people to over-
estimate the emotional impact of future events on their
lives—has received ample empirical support. For
example, it has been shown that romantic partners over-
estimate how bad they feel if their relationship ends,
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football fans overestimate their happiness after their
team won a game, college students overestimate their
negative emotions if they would be assigned to an
‘‘undesirable’’ dormitory, people gambling with money
overestimate how unhappy they feel when they lose,
professors overestimate their positive emotions follow-
ing a positive tenure decision, and people taking their
driver’s license exam overestimate their disappointment
after failing the exam (Dunn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2003;
Finkenauer, Gallucci, Van Dijk, & Pollmann, 2007;
Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998;
Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; Wilson,
Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000; see also
Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson,
2002; Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson,
2004; Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004;
Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Sanna & Schwarz,
2004; Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001, 2003).
In light of the pervasiveness of the impact bias, the
question arises whether people learn from their
experiences and correct for the impact bias. To
illustrate, after having failed to win an athletic compe-
tition, athletes may realize that their disappointment
was not as intense as they had forecasted. After having
lost several competitions, athletes should come to realize
that ‘‘this too will pass.’’ Although it is appealing to
predict that people will learn from their experiences
and diminish their impact bias, empirical evidence is
scarce. More important, the existing literature gives rise
to different predictions.
To investigate the influence of experience on the
impact bias, it is important to note that the impact bias
consists of two components of emotions. The first
component is the forecasted emotion, that is, the inten-
sity and duration of the emotion people anticipate to
experience after the future event has happened. The
second component is the felt emotion, that is, the inten-
sity and duration of the emotion people actually experi-
ence following the event. Experience with the event may
affect each component or both, thereby affecting the
impact bias. To illustrate, after having experienced
many failures in competitions, athletes may learn to
adjust their affective forecasts (i.e., they predict less
intense disappointment), they may learn to cope more
effectively with their emotions (i.e., they feel less disap-
pointment), or a combination of both.
Focusing on the effect of learning on affective
forecasts, researchers assume that to learn from their
experiences, people need to accurately recall their emo-
tions to previous events that are similar to the future event
for which they make an affective forecast. The literature
suggests, however, that people have a poor memory for
their affective experiences (e.g., Thomas & Diener, 1990;
Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, & Diener, 2003). To illustrate,
Wilson et al. (2003) showed that participants overestimate
not only the impact future events will have on their emo-
tions but also the impact past events had on their emo-
tions. Specifically, participants in their studies recalled
feeling more intense and more enduring emotions follow-
ing a past event than they actually felt immediately after
the event had happened. These studies clearly suggest that
people fail to learn that emotional reactions to events are
often less impactful than forecasted, because people recall
a more intense and more enduring emotion than these
events actually provoked. Similarly Ross (1989) demon-
strated that people often reconstruct previous affective
states inaccurately to match their beliefs and expectations.
Likewise Morewedge, Gilbert, and Wilson (2005) showed
that when remembering previous events, people tend to
recall atypical instances rather than typical ones. If people
recall unusual events to make forecasts about future
events, these forecasts may be inaccurate because people
rely on events that are unrepresentative of the past experi-
ences. Thus, research converges to suggest that people do
not accurately recall the intensity and duration of their
emotions.
Focusing on the effect of learning on felt emotions,
researchers suggest that people may become better and
more effective at emotion regulation with greater experi-
ence. To illustrate, in a study by Carstensen, Pasupathi,
Mayr, and Nesselroade (2000), participants ranging in
age from 18 to 94 participated in an experience-sampling
procedure in which they rated five emotions during a
1-week period. Negative emotional experiences declined
in frequency between the ages of 18 and 60. More
important, the authors calculated the extent to which
participants recovered from negative emotional experi-
ences and found that older people recovered more
efficiently from negative emotional experiences than
younger people, indicating that with age people learn
to better cope with emotions. Similarly, Labouvie-Vief
and her colleagues (Labouvie-Vief & Diehl, 2000;
Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson, DeVoe, & Schoeberlein,
1989) consistently found age to be associated with better
skills to integrate affect and cognition, thereby provid-
ing older people with more effective emotion regulation
and coping mechanisms. Thus, research on aging and
emotion regulation seems to suggest that with experi-
ence people learn to better recover from and cope with
their emotional reactions.
Taken together, the literature seems to suggest that
if learning affects the impact bias it is more likely to
influence people’s felt emotions than their forecasted
emotions. This gives rise to the counterintuitive hypoth-
esis that increased experience with an event increases
the impact bias. Specifically, people do not seem to
accurately recall previous emotional experiences, thus
experience should not affect subsequent affective fore-
casts. Experience should, however, affect felt emotions,
because people learn to cope more efficiently with their
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emotions. This indicates that people’s felt emotions will
be less intense the more experience they have with a
specific event. For the impact bias, this set of predictions
thus suggests that the difference between forecasted
emotions and felt emotions should increase with greater
experience. To our knowledge, there is no empirical
research that investigated how experience affects both
components of the impact bias.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
To test our hypotheses in a real-world setting we inves-
tigated affective forecasting in the context of competitive
track athletics. Because in competitive athletics people
are repeatedly confronted with successes and failures,
this context provides an excellent field setting in which
people have both gained experience with the focal event
and an opportunity to learn from this experience. In our
study we assessed the intensity of athletes’ forecasted
and experienced emotions following a track event. The
number of athletic competitions in which athletes
competed on average per year was assessed as indicator
of their athletic experience. Furthermore, we assessed
athletes’ appraisals of goal attainment desirability and
probability and attributions about their athletic per-
formance. These appraisals and attributions might
covary with athletic experience, thereby influencing the
intensity of athletes’ forecasted and felt emotions. For
example, research has shown that failing a goal evokes
more intense negative emotions the more this goal was
appraised as desirable or probable (Van Dijk & Van
der Pligt, 1997; Van Dijk, Van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg,
1999; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002a, b; Van Dijk, Zee-
lenberg, & Van der Pligt, 1999).
In our research we hypothesize, in line with our
analysis just presented, that athletes display an impact
bias and this impact bias becomes larger with more
athletic experience. Moreover, we expect athletic experi-
ence will differentially affect the two components of the
impact bias. Whereas experience will not alter athletes’
forecasted emotions, it will reduce the intensity of their
felt emotions. Support for our hypotheses would suggest
that people do not learn by experience to predict their
emotions more accurately, but that they do learn to cope
more effectively with their emotions.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 89 (46 male, 43 female; Mage¼ 25.81
years, SDage¼ 6.99 years) amateur and semiprofessional
track athletes. They were recruited during a Dutch
athletic competition and were offered a bottle of energy
drink as appreciation for their participation. All athletes
were members of the Royal Dutch Athletic Union, and
they participated, on average, in 18.40 (SD¼ 9.54)
athletic competitions per year.
Procedure
Six research assistants were recruited to help with the
data collection during different track events. Each
assistant met with several athletes prior to the start of
their track race. At the muster point, athletes were asked
to indicate their track event goal for their upcoming race
(in terms of running time and specified in up to one
hundredth of a second) and their appraisals of goal
attainment desirability and goal attainment probability.
Both appraisals were assessed by placing a mark on a
100mm line (appropriately labeled at each end), result-
ing in scores on a 100-point scale, whereby higher scores
indicated a higher desirability or a higher probability of
attaining their goal. Subsequently, athletes’ forecasted
positive and negative emotions were also assessed with
100-point scales, whereby higher scores indicated a
higher intensity of forecasted emotions. Positive emo-
tions were assessed by asking athletes to rate how much
happiness, contentment, and satisfaction they would feel
if they succeeded at reaching their goal (Cronbach’s
a¼ .89). Negative emotions were assessed by asking ath-
letes to rate how much disappointment, ‘‘sick with it,’’1
and frustration they would feel if they failed at reaching
their goal (a¼ .79). For about half of the athletes, posi-
tive emotions were assessed first, whereas for the
remaining athletes negative emotions were assessed first.
In addition, athletes provided information regarding
their age, gender, and the number of athletic competi-
tions in which they participated on average per year.
Immediately following their race, athletes’ running times
were recorded, and their felt positive and negative emo-
tions were assessed with 100-point scales. Positive emo-
tions were assessed by asking athletes to rate how much
happiness, contentment, and satisfaction they felt ‘‘at
this moment’’ (a¼ .93). Negative emotions were
assessed asking athletes to rate how much disappoint-
ment, ‘‘sick with it,’’ and frustration they felt ‘‘at this
moment’’ (a¼ .93). For about half of the athletes posi-
tive emotions were assessed first, whereas for the
remaining athletes negative emotions were assessed first.
Finally, athletes’ internal and external attributions for
their athletic performance were assessed by asking
athletes (on 100-point scales) to what extent they them-
selves were responsible for their running time and to
1We used the Dutch colloquial term balen. This term is represented
best by the English colloquial term ‘‘to be sick with it.’’
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what extent external circumstances were responsible for
their running time, respectively.
RESULTS
Unsuccessful and Successful Goal Attainment
Of the 89 athletes, 20 (11 female, 9 male) succeeded at
reaching their track event goal, whereas 69 (31 female,
37 male, 1 unreported gender) failed at reaching their
track event goal. A multivariate analysis of variance
with athletic experience, age, goal attainment desir-
ability, and goal attainment probability as dependent
variables and goal attainment (successful vs. unsucces-
sful) as independent variable yielded no significant
multivariate result, F(4, 80)¼ 2.14, p¼ .08. Follow-up
univariate analyses showed that successful and unsuc-
cessful athletes did not differ in the athletic experience,
age, goal attainment desirability, and goal attainment
probability (Fs< 3.87, ps> .05; see Table 1).
A multivariate analysis of variance with forecasted
positive and negative emotions and felt positive and
negative emotions as dependent variables and goal
attainment as independent variable yielded a significant
multivariate result, F(4, 84)¼ 6.36, p< .001, pg2¼ .23.
Follow-up univariate analyses showed that successful
and unsuccessful athletes did not differ in their fore-
casted emotions (Fs< 1.62, ps> .21). They did, however,
differ in their felt emotions. Successful athletes felt more
intense positive emotions and less intense negative
emotions than unsuccessful athletes, F(1, 88)¼ 16.51,
p< .001, pg2¼ .16 and F(1, 88)¼ 12.95, p¼ .001,
pg2¼ .13, respectively.
The Impact Bias in Track Athletics
Initial analyses did not yield significant gender effects
(Fs< 1). Therefore data were subsequently collapsed
across gender for the main analyses. The impact bias
implies that successful athletes overestimate the intensity
of their positive emotions, whereas unsuccessful athletes
overestimate the intensity of their negative emotions. To
investigate athletes’ impact bias a mixed analysis of
variance was conducted with focal emotions (i.e., fore-
casted and felt positive emotions for successful athletes
and forecasted and felt negative emotions for unsucces-
sful athletes, respectively) as repeated measures and goal
attainment as independent variable.2 This analysis
showed the following effects: A significant main effect
of goal attainment, F(1, 87)¼ 28.69, p< .001, pg2¼ .25,
indicating that across forecasted and felt emotions,
successful athletes rated their positive emotions as more
intense than unsuccessful athletes rated their negative
emotions. A significant effect of focal emotions, F(1,
87)¼ 5.30, p¼ .02, pg2¼ .16, indicated that, across posi-
tive and negative emotions, athletes predicted more
intense emotions than they actually felt. This effect
suggests that, as hypothesized, athletes display an
impact bias. A slight trend for an interaction effect of
goal attainment and focal emotions, F(1, 87)¼ 2.45,
p¼ .12, pg2¼ .03, suggests that the impact bias differs
for positive and negative emotions. Follow-up analyses
with planned comparisons showed that successful
athletes felt about equally intense positive emotions
(M¼ 72.63, SD¼ 22.34) as they had predicted
(M¼ 75.22, SD¼ 23.22; F< 1). Whereas unsuccessful
athletes felt less negative emotions (M¼ 36.96,
SD¼ 30.34) than they had predicted (M¼ 50.50,
SD¼ 23.10), F(1, 68)¼ 15.79, p< .001, pg2¼ .19. This
TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Relevant Variables for
Successful and Unsuccessful Goal Attainment
Goal Attainment
Variable Successful Unsuccessful
No. of athletes 20 69
Age of athletes
M 28.35 25.05
SD 8.95 6.15
Experience in track athletics
M 16.70 18.90
SD 11.07 9.06
Desirability goal attainment
M 74.25 84.86
SD 32.47 16.49
Probability goal attainment
M 67.25 64.49
SD 19.28 19.01
Forecasted positive emotions
M 75.22 81.53
SD 23.45 18.40
Forecasted negative emotions
M 54.78 50.50
SD 28.65 23.10
Felt positive emotions
M 72.63a 44.66b
SD 22.34 28.21
Felt negative emotions
M 10.88a 36.96b
SD 20.79 30.34
Note. Different subscripts within each row represent significant
differences between means.
2Athletes were asked to predict their positive emotions after suc-
cessful goal attainment and their negative emotions after unsuccessful
goal attainment. Neither athletes’ forecasted negative emotions after
successful goal attainment nor their forecasted positive emotions after
unsuccessful goal attainment were assessed. Therefore we did not con-
duct an overall mixed analysis of variance with focal emotions as
repeated measures and goal attainment (successful vs. unsuccessful)
and valence of emotions (positive vs. negative) as independent
variables.
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effect indicates that, as hypothesized, the impact bias is
more pronounced for negative emotions following
unsuccessful goal attainment than for positive emotions
following successful goal attainment.
The Impact Bias and Athletic Experience
To investigate the influence of athletic experience on the
impact bias for positive emotions following successful
goal attainment and the impact bias for negative
emotions following unsuccessful goal attainment, separ-
ate regression analyses were conducted for successful
and unsuccessful athletes. The impact bias was operatio-
nalized as the difference score between forecasted and
felt positive emotions in the analyses for successful
athletes and as the difference score between forecasted
and felt negative emotions in the analyses for unsucces-
sful athletes. In both series of regression analyses we
regressed the impact bias on goal attainment desir-
ability, goal attainment probability, internal attribution,
external attribution, age, and athletic experience.
Analyses for successful athletes showed that none of
these six variables reliably predicted the impact bias
for successful goal attainment, ts< 1.21, ps> .24.
Analyses for unsuccessful athletes showed that athletic
experience predicted a larger impact bias (B¼ 0.90),
t(58)¼ 2.17, p¼ .03. None of the other five variables
reliably predicted the impact bias (ts< 1; see Table 2
for relevant correlations). These findings indicate that
athletic experience predicted the impact bias for negative
emotions following unsuccessful goal attainment.
Of importance, additional analyses showed that
athletic experience did not predict athletes’ goal setting.
There was no statistical relationship between, on one
hand, the difference between athletes’ goal and their
actual running time and, on the other hand, athletic
experience, r(68)¼ .05, p¼ .69 and r(20)¼ .08, p¼ .75,
for successful and unsuccessful athletes, respectively.
These results suggest that experienced and less experi-
enced athletes set about equally realistic goals.
Athletic Experience and Forecasted and
Felt Emotions
To investigate how precisely athletic experience affects the
impact bias separate regression analyses were conducted
for positive emotions of successful athletes and negative
emotions of unsuccessful athletes. First, we regressed
forecasted emotions on goal attainment desirability, goal
attainment probability, internal attribution, external attri-
bution, age, and athletic experience. Second, we regressed
felt emotions on these six predictors.
Analyses for successful athletes showed that when
goal attainment was appraised more desirable, athletes
predicted to feel more intense positive emotions
(B¼ 0.37), t(13)¼ 2.38, p¼ .03. None of the other five
variables was a reliable predictor of forecasted positive
emotions, ts< 1.21, ps> .25. Furthermore, results
showed that none of the six variables reliably predicted
athletes’ felt positive emotions, ts< 1.13, ps> .27.
Analyses for unsuccessful athletes showed that when
goal attainment was appraised more desirable, athletes
predicted to feel more intense negative emotions
(B¼ 0.36), t(58)¼ 2.05, p< .05. None of the other five
variables was a reliable predictor of forecasted negative
emotions, ts< 1.08, ps> .28. Results concerning felt
negative emotions showed that when goal attainment
was appraised more desirable, athletes felt more intense
negative emotions (B¼ 0.57), t(58)¼ 2.57, p¼ .01. More
important, results showed that athletic experience
predicted less intense felt emotions (B¼ –1.19),
t(58)¼ –2.87, p¼ .006. None of the other four variables
reliably predicted felt negative emotions (ts< 1). These
results indicate that athletic experience did not affect
athletes’ forecasted negative emotions, but it did affect
athletes’ felt negative emotions. That is, athletes felt less
TABLE 2
Correlations Between Variables Involved in Regression Analyses for Unsuccessful Athletes
Variable
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Athletic experience —
2. Impact bias negative emotions .24y —
3. Forecasted negative emotions .06 .32 —
4. Felt negative emotions .27 .68 .47 —
5. Age .09 .02 .14 .12 —
6. Desirability goal attainment .19 .01 .30 .23y .03 —
7. Probability goal attainment .16 .08 .06 .03 .11 .15 —
8. Internal attribution .17 .10 .12 .01 .11 .21y .06 —
9. External attribution .31 .00 .02 .01 .06 .10 .17 —
Note. 65N 69.
yp< 10. p< .05.
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intense negative emotions the more athletic experience
they had.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our research investigated the role of experience in
affective forecasting. Using a field study among track
athletes, we replicated existing findings on affective fore-
casting and the positive-negative asymmetry of the
impact bias. Moreover, we extend previous findings by
showing how experience with an event influences both
components of the impact bias, forecasted emotions
and felt emotions.
Athletes grossly overestimated the intensity of their
negative emotions toward failing to reach their goal.
Consistent with recent findings on the impact bias
(e.g., Dunn et al., 2003; Finkenauer et al., 2007; Kermer
et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2001; see Wilson & Gilbert,
2003), they show an impact bias, and this bias is more
pronounced for unsuccessful goal attainment than for
successful goal attainment. These findings provide an
elegant demonstration of the impact bias in a real-world
context. Although our findings converge with earlier
research, showing that the impact bias is more
pronounced for negative events than for positive events,
given the relative small subsample of successful athletes
our findings concerning successful goal attainment
should be treated with some caution.
Our research is the first to show how experience
affects both components of the impact bias, thereby
extending previous research in important ways. First,
our results show that regarding forecasted emotions ath-
letes’ experience did not affect their forecasted emotions.
Our results thereby suggest that people do not learn
from their experiences and correct for the impact bias.
This is in line with Wilson et al.’s (2001) suggestion that,
although experience with a negative event may improve
the accuracy of one’s affective forecasts in certain situa-
tions, the extent to which people learn from their affect-
ive forecasting errors seems to be quite limited. The
magnitude of the impact bias for negative events might
be so large that it remains even after people have
corrected for it to some degree. Moreover, ample
research has shown that the impact bias is pervasive
and that people display this bias for events that they
had experienced before and could have learned from, such
as sports games, missing a train, presidential elections,
term papers, and exams (Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-James,
Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007; Finkenauer et al., 2007;
Gilbert, Morewedge et al., 2004; Gilbert et al., 1998;
Wilson et al., 2000). Furthermore, research found no link
between people’s age and their reports of how they
would feel right after the events (Wilson, Gilbert, &
Salthouse, as cited in Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).3
Second, our results show that athletes’ felt negative
emotions were affected by experience with track
athletics. Negative emotions became less intense with
more experience. Our results thereby support the
suggestion that people may become better and more
effective at emotion regulation with greater experience
(cf. Carstensen et al., 2000). Thus our study is the first
to show that people experience affects the impact bias
and that it influences their emotional experience and
not their emotion forecast. These effects lead to the
counterintuitive observation that increased experience
with an event increases the impact bias.
One explanation for the finding that experience leads
to less intense negative emotions may be that with experi-
ence people learn to better recover and cope with
emotional reactions. More experience implies more fam-
iliarity with negative events and therefore people may
learn to down regulate their negative emotions more
effectively. A major source for the impact bias is that
people may fail to anticipate that when emotional events
occur, they swiftly regulate these events by rationalizing,
reconstructing, or reinterpreting them (Gilbert et al.,
1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). These regulation pro-
cesses, which might include dissonance reduction, self-
affirmation, motivated reasoning, and positive illusions
(e.g., Festinger, 1957; Kunda, 1990; Steele, 1988; Taylor,
1991; Tesser, 2000), transform emotion-producing events
psychologically in ways that ameliorate their impact
and speed recovery from them. However, by failing to
take into account how rapidly these processes occur,
people tend to overestimate the intensity of their future
emotional reactions. Although people are motivated to
make sense of any novel and emotion-producing event,
they are especially motivated to regulate events that are
negative and potentially challenge their sense of well-
being. Therefore the impact bias is usually larger for
negative events than for positive events, as we found
also in our research (cf. Finkenauer et al., 2007; Kermer
et al., 2006; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).
Why do people clearly overestimate their future nega-
tive emotions? An accurate prediction of how one would
feel following a future event could enable people to
make more optimal decisions concerning possible
courses of action. Therefore, would it not be better if
people could accurately predict, for example, how much
failure hurts? A possible answer to this question might
be that overestimating future emotions serves a self-
regulatory function (cf. Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005).
3This study did, however, show that after the age of 60 people
showed a decrease in the predicted duration of their emotional reac-
tions. This finding suggests that people might learn that their emotion-
al reactions return to baseline relatively quickly but that this
realization might come only after a great amount of experience.
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It could, for example, motivate people to try harder to
avoid negative events in order to prevent the experience
of the anticipated strong negative emotions. The
advantage of experience might lie primarily in a better
regulation of negative emotions.
Possible Limitations and Future Directions
Although our findings support our hypotheses, because
of the correlational nature of our data, we are not able
to draw conclusions about the underlying causal
relationship between experience and (forecasted and felt)
emotions. In our study, neither success nor failure in goal
attainment was experimentally manipulated. Parti-
cipants were also not randomly assigned to different
levels of experience with the focal event. As our study
was a nonexperimental field study the lack of experi-
mental control of the variables under investigation may
represent a limitation to our research. Although our
real-world setting increases the ecological validity of
our findings, causal statements about specific
relationships between different variable are not possible.
We cannot exclude the possibility that our findings can
be attributed to specific characteristics of successful or
unsuccessful athletes or to specific features of experi-
enced and less experienced athletes. For example, our
finding that more experienced athletes reported relatively
little negative emotions following unsuccessful goal
attainment might be because of selection effects, whereby
athletes who experience strong negative emotions drop
out of competition. However, the robustness of our find-
ings and their consistency with experimental studies
increases our faith in our findings. Moreover, our find-
ings indicate that successful and unsuccessful athletes
did not differ in athletic experience, age, desirability of
goal attainment, probability of goal attainment, and
forecasted emotions. Our findings also showed that ath-
letic experience was not related to goal setting, desir-
ability of goal attainment, probability of goal
attainment, or age. The fact that we controlled for these
many potential confounds make alternative explanations
for our obtained findings less likely.
Because our study was conducted in a competitive
environment, future research might need to replicate
our results in other goal-directed domains, which are
not as competitive (e.g., saving money, losing weight,
etc.). Furthermore, future research could focus on
experimentally inducing the (non-)attainment of goals
and manipulating participants’ experience with the focal
event. This would allow for making causal statement
about the hypothesized relations. To investigate the
effect of experience on the duration of emotions,
follow-up studies could combine several assessments of
affective forecasts before the focal event took place
and several assessments after the event took place. These
studies enable to examine possible dynamic changes in
both positive and negative emotions (cf. Finkenauer
et al., 2007). Moreover, future research could examine
the specific regulation processes people employ after
goal failure. By assessing regulation processes more
specifically after the event took place, the role of
experience in these processes could be addressed more
directly.
Concluding Remarks
Our study investigated how experience affects the
impact bias. Findings of this study suggest that experi-
ence with an event does not affect people’s subsequent
affective forecasts, but it does clearly influence their
negative affective experiences. Felt negative affect will
be less intense the more experience people have with a
specific negative event. Our research suggests that
experience may not teach people to predict their future
emotions more accurately, but it might teach them
how to regulate their felt negative emotions more effec-
tively. Thus, experience may not be the teacher of all
things, it certainly does teach some important lessons.
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